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On Sunday the Iraqi cabinet finally approved the so-called Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States. The security pact, which sets a timetable for the removal of U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31st, 2011, is currently being debated before the 275 seat Iraqi parliament. Expected to come to a vote before November 25th, the SOFA agreement signed in Baghdad by Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari and US Ambassador Ryan Crocker, first went through revisions during a negotiating period between the two countries. Though Iraqi negotiators were able to acquire an actual troop withdrawal date, they made concessions on a number of their desired amendments. For example, Iraqi authorities will not be able to try U.S. soldiers for any crimes committed off-base. Instead such legal matters will be subject to a joint U.S. – Iraq committee that will make decisions accordingly. Whether or not the Iraqi parliament decides to pass the SOFA agreement next week, there will be opposition. Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is solidly opposed to the SOFA agreement and the Sunni Arab parliamentary bloc, The Accordance Front, says that it should be put to the public through a national referendum.

GUEST: Phyllis Bennis, fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington and the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam. Her newest books include Ending the Iraq War: A Primer and Understanding the US-Iran Crisis: A Primer

Rough Transcript:

Kolhatkar: We had discussed this Status of Forces Agreement some weeks ago with Raed Jarrar as it was being negotiated; so right now it looks close to being passed or is expected to be passed by the Iraqi parliament, albeit with opposition.

What do you understand from the final document about exactly when U.S. troops will withdraw and how many will stay?

Bennis: Well, this is one of the remaining mysteries, partly because we don’t know for sure if the version that is now circulating around in the press is actually the version that the White House signed. This has been a very opaque process; there has been virtually no transparency. Members of Congress in the U.S. don’t have access to it, certainly the public doesn’t. The version that is circulating around, which has been translated, does use the language, “…ALL U.S. forces…” in describing the troops that will be out by the end of December 2001. There’s a specific reference to combat forces that will be removed from the cities and redeployed in U.S. bases by the end of June of 2009. Now it remains, actually, unclear whether the language in this version that says, “…ALL troops will be removed…” by the end of 2011 is accurate, or whether it also refers to combat troops, or perhaps just troops, leaving open or leaving some wiggle room about what remains behind. So it’s very uncertain right now.

If we take the existing text it does seem to say that ALL troops would be out by — would be required to leave by—the end of 2011.

Kolhatkar: And when you say, “required to leave,” you mean leave including the bases?

Bennis: Well, the bases are dealt with separately. There is reference to the bases being turned back over to the Iraqis at the time of the U.S. withdrawal; but, all of this, of course, is tempered by two things. One is, there’s reference to each country—each government—being able to request changes. So, certainly the Iraqi government, if they felt they had public support, and, frankly, if this government survives that long—which remains an uncertain question—could request of the U.S. that they remain, that the troops remain longer.

Secondly, we’ve seen from how the U.S. has behaved in, for example, Pakistan, with whose government it has a much longer standing and closer alliance, that it has absolutely ignored the views and opinions of the Pakistani government and has routinely violated Pakistani airspace and in many occasions Pakistani territories, to carry out military attacks on what the U.S. says are Al Qaeda and Taliban-backed fighters.

If that’s the example of how the U.S. treats its allies, I think that one of the aspects that we have to look at with this accord is whether the U.S. has any intention of being bound by the terms at all.

Kolhatkar: Now, there’s some discussion here in the United States about the U.S. Congress should be approving the agreement just that the Iraqi Parliament is going to be required to take a vote. What do you think?

Bennis: Well, this has been an ongoing battle. The Bush Administration has taken the position that it is not obligated to bring this treaty to the Senate for ratification, despite the U.S. Constitution saying that every treaty must be ratified by the Senate, because the Bush Administration claim is this is not a treaty. This is simply what is known as a SOFA Agreement—a Status of Forces Agreement—and the Bush Administration’s spokespeople say it’s just like the SOFA Agreement we have in dozens and scores of other countries all around the world. Except for the fact that they don’t mention that Iraq is at war, that the U.S. troops in Iraq are fighting a brutal occupation and war. They’re not simply sitting in their bases. So, the notion that this is simply a SOFA Agreement like the SOFA Agreement the U.S. has with Germany or with Italy, or with any other country, is simply nonsense.

The question is whether—how far—Congress, and particularly the Senate, will go in demanding ratification. Congressman Bill Delahunt has taken the lead in holding some very important hearings on this issue, demanding that there be this kind of accountability to Congress. But, part of the problem is: if it goes to Congress, it’s quite likely that it would pass, particularly now after the election, and I think that the question of focusing solely on the ratification issue is limiting how Congress actually approaches it. I think there’s not enough substantive opposition emerging yet to what the accord actually says.

At the end of the day, of course, this is an accord that authorizes three more years of occupation, and that’s a disaster for the people of Iraq—also a disaster for the people of this country.

Kolhatkar: Phyllis, in any of the versions you have seen, or THE version that you’ve seen, of the Status of Forces Agreement, is there anything that would require—or that specifically spells out—a certain number of U.S. troops and/or military contractors staying in Iraq to help train Iraqi forces or help them with their security indefinitely?

Bennis: No. There’s no numbers, there’s also…the only reference to the contractors has to do with the question of jurisdiction; and this is an interesting one, because… so essentially there’s nothing in it that says the contractors have to be removed. What it does say, and this was probably the one substantive victory in the negotiations for the Iraqi side, the jurisdiction over any contractor that is accused of a major crime—whether it’s murder, rape, all of the crimes that we have seen contractors carry out time and time again throughout this occupation—the jurisdiction over hearing those crimes, trying those people, would rest solely with Iraq.

Now, this was a big argument. The U.S. wanted to keep jurisdiction on the U.S. side, which has led, of course, to complete impunity for the contractors. But the Iraqis won that concession. They did not win that concession for U.S. soldiers, who remain under U.S. jurisdiction. And, in fact, although there is reference to Iraq having jurisdiction over a U.S. soldier who carries out a major crime—murder, rape, etcetera—off base, and while off duty…this was something trumpeted by the Iraqi leaders as a great victory for them. But, the reality is, two paragraphs later, in the same article, it makes clear that the decision of whether some U.S. soldier was, in fact, off duty will be made by the American side. So, of course, that still gives the U.S. the power to keep any U.S. soldier out of Iraqi jurisdiction.

But, there’s nothing about numbers; there’s no requirement that the mercenaries or contractors be withdrawn.

Kolhatkar: Phyllis, the opposition to this plan… I want to ask you what it’s based on. I mean, the main opposition within the Iraqi Parliament are those who are loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr, and then the main Sunni Arab political block, but also Iran and Syria oppose this agreement. What is their basis for opposing it?

Bennis: Well, I think it’s different. I think that the most commonly held basis of opposition is simply that this gives credibility to three more years of occupation. It institutionalizes U.S. control for three more years.

There’s a second agreement that’s being negotiated simultaneously with the Status of Forces Agreement that is far broader—that involves economic issues, it involves a host of foreign aid, cultural exchange, a whole range of other things—and there’s problems with that one as well. But, this is the one that really institutionalizes ongoing U.S. control. And I think, in that context, that’s the basis for the opposition for the Nationalist forces in Iraq, which would include Muqtada al-Sadr’s supporters…they’re not the only ones, certainly.

There’s also various kinds of sectarian jockeying among various sectoral-based parties, some of the Sunni parties, who are looking for more concessions of various sorts, are using opposition to this agreement as a way to garner more public support by putting themselves forward as the strongest supporters of Iraqi national rights and Iraqi sovereignty. So, part of the problem is that the whole political debate over this agreement—over the text of this agreement—has a whole other undercurrent of the political jockeying that’s going on in Iraq in anticipation of the elections…the regional elections that are scheduled for next spring. So, I think that’s a lot of what we’re seeing—much more than substantive disagreement to it among the leaders.

There’s massive public opposition, from what we can hear, to the idea of giving credibility and legitimacy and legality to the U.S. occupation. Something like eighty-five percent or more of Iraqis want the occupation over soon, or now. So, having it be institutionalized for three more years is not going to satisfy that popular opinion.

Kolhatkar: And it should be mentioned that the U.N. mandate expires next month, so this Status of Forces Agreement essentially legitimizes U.S. presence for at least three years; but, still, three years is better than forever, Phyllis…

Bennis: Absolutely! And, we should also note that this was something that was forced on the Bush Administration—not only because of the expiration of the U.N. mandate, because they certainly have the alternative of going back to the U.N. and there’s no doubt that the U.N. would have extended it—but because the Bush Administration has faced such massive opposition in this country, as well as internationally, to the continuation to the U.S. occupation of Iraq. And I think that it is important that even while we recognize the serious limitations of the actual text of this agreement, that we also see it as a huge victory for anti-war forces in this country that have forced the Bush Administration that cut its political teeth in Iraq on the claim that there would never be a timetable. We have forced the administration to put forward, as its own, a text and agreement that is based on a firm timetable that is not controlled by, quote, “conditions on the ground.”

Special Thanks to Lisa Petras for transcribing this interview.